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The Chesapeake Bay oyster culture is traditional. In 
both Maryland and Virginia most oysters are taken by 
hand from natural oyster bars. Existing laws limit 
access to the residents of the respective states, and 
discourage new technologies and mariculture. 
A recent Supreme Court decision, Douglas v. Sea-
coast Products, Inc., may change this culture. It~• 
primary impact may be a highly mobile interstate 
oyster fleet free to search out productive oyster 
grounds without regard for state boundaries; its 
secondary impact may be renewed interest in private 
oyster leases, mariculture, and the introduction of 
new species of oysters. 
The paper which follows examines these prospects. 
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Part I 
CHESAPEAKE BAY OYSTER LAWS 
The Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery is divided into 
three regulatory regions. Virginia waters are regu-
lated exclusively by that state. The Potomac River, 
the south bank of which forms the Maryland-Virginia 
border, is regulated by the Potomac River Fisheries 
• 
Commission created by a compact between the two 
states. 1 Other Maryland waters are regulated exclu-
sively by that state. The Chesapeake oyster industry 
remains strongly rooted in its cultural and historical 
origins, 2 but despite its reluctance to copy the inno-
vative methods used to boost oyster production in 
other regions and in other countries, the natural 
advantages of this Bay enable the two states to pro-
duce a major portion of the country's oyster harvest. 
The regulation of the Chesapeake oyster industry 
begins with the demarcation of public oyster bars. 
These areas, with a natural capability for oyster 
growing, are regulated in both states as a common 
fishery within which private leases are forbidden. 3 
This basic division restricts the development of 
private oyster culture to those remaining areas which 
are generally less likely to favor such attempts. In 
Virginia, the original designation of natural oyster 
bars was made in 1892 in the Baylor survey, and these 
designations, as modified by subsequent statutes, are 
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deemed to be conclusive in Virginia courts on the ques-
tion of the limits of the natural oyster beds. 4 The 
original survey of Maryland's natural oyster beds was 
completed in 1912. 5 That survey can be modified by 
either of two procedures. The Maryland Department of 
Natural Resources is authorized to reclassify submerged 
lands to reflect the actual character of the bottom, 
after public hearings and possible court appeals. 6 
Also, whenever anyone applies for a lease of an area 
not classified as a natural oyster bar, his application 
may be defeated by a protest supported by evidence that 
"the public has resorted to the bar for a livelihood, 
whether continuously or at intervals, during any oyster / 
season within five years prior to the filing of an V 
application. 117 If a protest succeeds, the designat.ion 
of natural oyster bars must be enlarged accordingly. 8 \ 
Private oyster leases account for a far greater 
proportion of the area harvested in Virginia than Mary-
land. Virginia has 243,000 acres of public oyster 
grounds and over 100,000 acres in leases. 9 Maryland, 
on the other hand, has some 350,000 acres of public 
bars and about 9,000 acres in private leases. 10 Stated 
another way, private leases in Virginia occupy over 
ten times the area of Maryland's private grounds. 
Part of this difference may be attributable to less 
favorable regulation of private leasing in Maryland. 
Maryland limits the total acreage which may be 
leased to a single individual to 500 acres in the 
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main body of the Bay, and 30 acres in tributaries. 11 
Virginia allows one leaseholder to accumulate up to 
5,000 acres in the Bay and up to 3,000 acres in tribu-
taries.12 Maryland does not permit leases to corpora-
tions; corporate leaseholders are welcome in Virginia:3 
Virginia charges an annual rent of one dollar and fify 
cents per acre, an amount set by statute, whereas Mary-
land charges slightly more at present, two dollars per 
14 
acre per year. Each state allows twenty year terms, 
but only in Virginia is the lease automatically 
renewed. 15 Power dredging, by far the most efficient 
harvesting method, is permitted on private grounds 
Monday through Saturday in Virginia, while Marylanders 
may dredge under power only two days per week. 16 
Virginia prohibits exports of seed oysters if the 
Commissioner of Marine Resources determines that there 
is only enough for Virginia planters. 17 Maryland 
leaseholders receive no similar protection: the state 
must place the first one million bushels of seed 
oysters taken in its repletion program on public bars, 
and can sell no more than half of what remains to pri-
18 
vate lessees. As if these restrictions and the fre-
~uent protests against lease applications were not 
enough to discourage a prospective oyster farmer, 
Maryland has enacted an outright prohibition on leas-
,',.ing in five major tidewater counties a~d in parts of 
"xth 19 a S1 • 
: ,On the Potomac River, oyster leasing is prohibited 
. / 
20 
under the 1958 Potomac River Compact. This restric-
tion can only be lifted by the action of both states. 
The public oyster bars of the Chesapeake are regu-
lated as three distinct fisheries. Each area is 
managed through a combination of gear restrictions, 21 
seasonal limits, 22 culling requirements, 23 pollution 
closures, 24 entry restrictions, 25 and repletion pro-
grams. It is difficult to describe the nature of 
these restrictions and limitations because they come \ 
', 
together in a variety of permutations and combinations 
with manifold exemptions and exclusions. Generally, 
however: the taking of oysters under sail power and 
with hand operated tongs is encouraged while the taking 
of oysters under motor power or with a dredge is r~, 
stricted; taking of oysters during the summer months 
is prohibited; oysters smaller than three inches 
across must be culled and returned to the beds; public 
health officials have authority to close oyster bars 
when there is a danger of contamination; and each 
state limits entry to their respective citizens, while 
Potomac waters are open to the citizens of both states 
to the exclusion of all others. 
It is somewhat easier to generalize the_ c_on9-eq1:1_en.,ces 
of these regulations. They have not increased the 
. ··-· 6 
physical yiel~-- of' the f_~sh~;t"Y. 2 In Virginia, state-
wide oyster production declined from over 3.5 million 
bushels annually just prior to 1960 to about one 
million bushels in 1977; 27 on the Potomac production 
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dropped from 146,846 bushels in the production year 
ending in 1964 (7/1/63 to 6/30/64) to 29,508 bushels 
in the production year ending in 1977, only to rebound 
to 166,282 bushels in the production year ending in 
1978;28 in Maryland 1,635,123 bushels were harvested 
in 1960, while 1,851,564 bushels were harvested in 
1977. 29 Credit for the upsurge in the Potomac yield 
and jor the sustenance of the Maryland yield is 
generally extended to the oyster repletion programs 
which these jurisdictions conduct. 30 These programs, 
which involve the rebuilding and reseeding of public 
oyster bars, in 1977 cost over $200,000 in Potomac 
waters, and over one million dollars in Maryland 
waters. 31 
Chesapeake oyster laws have had other consequences. 
They have foreclosed the use of modern gear such as 
, ~wer operated dredges which would permit the taking 
/ of oysters at a significantly lower cost. They have 
created a parochial preference for the citizens of 
respective states, but by so doing, may have inter-
fered with development of mutually advantageous trade-
offs between Maryland and Virginia in waters other 
than the Potomac's. Finally, (and, serendipitously) 
they have preserved a remnant of the pictur~sque 
maritime heritage of classic bay vessels--but for the 
oyster laws, skipjacks and bugeyes wohld have. long 
since been extinct. 
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Part II 
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 
The Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery relies principally 
on the cultivation of public oyster bars. As was 
discussed above, these bars are regulated through a 
variety of measures intended to conserve the resource, 
including entry restrictions. A recent Supreme Court 
d~cision raises substantial questions over the legiti-
macy of laws in Maryland and Virginia which exclude 
nonresident oystermen. While at present, Maryland 
watermen are restricted to Maryland waters and Virgin-
ians are restricted to Virginia and Potomac River 
waters, the Supreme Court's ruling in Douglas v. Sea-
32 -,-
coast Products, Inc., strongly suggests that a 
mobile, interstate connnercial oyster fleet will even-
tually ply the waters of the Chesapeake Bay without 
regard to state boundaries. 
The specific conflict presented in the Douglas case 
arose when the Commissioner of Virginia Marine Re-
sources refused to issue a license which would allow 
Seacoast Products, Inc. to catch menhaden in Virginia's 
territorial waters. The reason for his refusal was 
that under two provisions of state law, the nonresi-
dent company was ineligible for commercial fishing 
licenses. Section 21.1-60 of the Virginia Code pro-
hibited persons other than Virginia residents ("any 
person who has actually resided in Virginia for 
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twelve months") from fishing for menhaden in the Vir-
ginia portion of the Chesapeake Bay. 33 However, non-
resident corporations were eligible for menhaden 
licenses to fish in the three mile wide marginal sea 
along Virginia's eastern coast if United States citi-
zens owned and controlled at least seventy-five per-
cent of its stock. Seacoast Products was founded in 
1911, incorporated in Delaware, maintaining its prin-
, 
cipal offices in New Jersey and qualified to do busi-
34 
ness in Virginia. In 1973 Seacoast was sold to 
Hanson Trust Limited, a British company, the stock of 
which is held almost entirely by aliens. 35 Because 
Seacoast was no longer owned by United States citizens, 
it was prohibited under Virginia law from fishing for 
menhaden in the Bay, as well as in the marginal sea. 
Seacoast then filed a complaint in federal court 
challenging the constitutionality of the Virginia sta-
tutes. A three judge court was convened which agreed 
with Seacoast's contention that "since the licenses 
are granted to Virginia domestic and resident corpor-
ations but refused nonresident corporations, there is 
discrimination in contravention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment assurance of equal protection of the laws. 136 
The state of Virginia appealed that ruling to the 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision, but on 
another ground. The Court stated that it was unneces-
sary to reach the constitutional questions raised by 
the parties, since it found that the two Virginia 
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statutes were preempted by federal vessel enrollment 
and licensing laws. 37 Since Seacoast's vessels had 
been properly enrolled and since they had been 
licensed to catch any type of fish, "we conclude that 
[they] had been granted the right to fish in Virginia 
waters on the same terms as Virginia residents. 1138 
The principal authority for this conclusion, aside 
from the licensing statutes and the prescribed form 
of the license itself, was the case of Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 39 decided in 1824. In that case the court 
ruled that a New York statue creating a steamboat 
monopoly in New York waters was preempted by the 
federal laws under which a would be competitor had 
enrolled and licensed his vessel. Since Gibbons' 
steamboat was federally licensed to engage in the 
coasting trade, the court held that the license not 
only ·identified the national character of the vessel, 
but also conveyed the right to transport passengers 
and freight in coastal waters free from state-created 
monopolies. The Douglas decision reasoned that since 
Seacoast held licenses for the mackeral fishery, 
which is defined to include "the taking of fish of 
every description", 40 it not only identified the 
enterprise pursued, but also authorized Seacoast to 
carry on that enterprise: 
"And just as Gibbons and its progeny found a 
grant of the right to trade in a State without 
discrimination, we conclude that [Seacoast's 
vessels] have been granted the right to fish 
in Virginia waters on the same terms as Vir-
ginia residents. 11 41 
2 4 
The ruling in the Douglas decision more or less 
compels the conclusion that a federal vessel licence 
entitles a nonresident to harvest oysters (as well as 
finfish) on the same terms as residents. The form of 
the license, as prescribed by statute, states that a 
license to engage in the mackeral fishery authorizes 
"the'taking of fish of every description including 
shellfish. 1142 Records of the Coast Guard offices in 
the Chesapeake Bay region show a total of 2,491 
federally licensed fishing vessels, 1,786 engaged in 
fishing generally and 705 principally engaged in 
oystering. 43 There is also, of course, the possibility 
that the removal of state entry restrictions may 
attract to the Chesapeake Bay federally licensed fish-
ing vessels from other regions. Hence, Douglas has 
the immediate impact of removing residency limitations 
on access to Chesapeake Bay for thousands of vessels. 
An interesting question is the extent to which the 
Douglas decision may encourage application for federal 
licenses. The federal enrollment and licensing laws 
only require licensing of vessels displacing over 
five tons; 44 many traditional Chesapeake Bay workboats 
displace less than five tons. The Douglas ruling 
provides an incentive to the operators of such boats 
I , 
(whether Maryland or Virginia) to obtain a license, 
and to thereby obtain access to the whole Bay. 
Whether vessels displacing less than five tons are 
eligible for federal licenses is problematic. 
2 
A second interesting question is whether the 
Douglas ruling renders Maryland's and Virginia's resi-
dency requirements unconstitutional. Although decid-
ing the case on the narrow grounds of preemption, the 
Court went on to say: 
"A number of coastal States have discriminatory 
fisheries laws, and with all natural resources 
becoming increasingly scarce and more valuable, 
more and more such restrictions would be a likely 
prospect, as both protective and retaliatory 
measures. Each State's fishermen eventually 
might be effectively limited to working in the 
territorial waters of their residence, or in 
the federally controlled fishery beyond the 
three mile limit. Such proliferation of resi-
dency requirements for commercial fishermen •.,i. 
would create exactly the sort of Balkanization 
of interstate commercial activity which the 
Constitution was intended to prevent. 1145 
This view of the respective state and federal inter-
ests suggests that the Supreme Court would not be 
reluctant to extend the holding in Douglas to pre-
clude state residency requirements for oystermen, 
The possibility that state access restrictions on 
the Chesapeake oyster fishery may be struck down as 
unconstitutional is reinforced by a Supreme Court 
decision handed down several months after Douglas, 
in the case of Hicklin v. O;beck. 46 An Alaska sta-
tute required that every oil and gas lease to which 
the state is a party must contain terms assuring the 
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hiring of qualified Alaska residents in preference to 
nonresidents. When nonresidents challenged the con-
stitutionality of the "Alaska Hire" law, the state 
argued that its ownership of oil and gas reserves was 
a sufficient justification for confining the benefits 
of exploiting those resources to state residents. 
The Supreme Court disagreed: 
"Although the fact that a state owned resource 
is tlestined for interstate commerce does not, 
of itself, disable the State from preferring 
its own citizens in the utilization of that re-
source, it does inform analysis under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause as to the permissi-
bility of the discrimination the State visits 
upon nonresidents based on its ownership of the 
resource. Here the oil and gas upon which Alaska 
hinges its discrimination against nonresidents 
are of profound national importance. On the other 
hand the breadth of the discrimination mandated 
by Alaska Hire goes far beyond the degree of re-
sident bias Alaska's ownership of the oil and 
gas can justifiably support. The confluence 
of these realities points to but one conclusion: 
Alaska Hire cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed in 
Baldwin v.G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935), 
the Constitution "was framed" upon the theory 
that the peoples of the several states must sink 
or swim together, and that in the long run pros-
perity and4salvation are in union and not division." 7 
As the Douglas decision revealed, the Court recognized 
the commercial fisheries of the coastal states as im-
portant components of the nation's intetstate commerce. 
Therefore, the residency discriminations of the Chesa-
peake oyster fishery are no less likely to withstand 
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constitutional scrutiny than Alaska's attempted pre-
ferment of residents in developing its oil and gas 
resources. 
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Part III 
THE FUTURE OF THE CHESAPEAKE OYSTER FISHERY 
The preceding analysis presents the real possibility 
that Chesapeake Bay oysters will in the future be 
harvested by a mobile interstate work force. Fortu-
nately, there is an instructive and analogous prece-
dent ~o the elimination of state residency restric-
tions which the Douglas decision forebodes. That pre-
cedent is the elimination of county residency restric-
tions on Maryland commercial shellfish harvesters as 
/a result of the state court ruling in Bruce v. Direc-
tor, Department of Chesapeake Bay Affa~n 1971. 48 
Prior to the Bruce case, Maryland law prohibited a 
waterman from taking oysters with hand tongs or 
patent tongs in waters outside the county in which he 
resided. Similar restraints applied to crabbers. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that these statutes 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article 23 of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Maryland Constitution: 
"We think the statues set fourth an unlawful 
classification of persons and discriminate 
not only among the several watermen of the 
13 tidewater counties in which crabs and oysters 
are found in marketable quantities, but also 
between residents of these counties and those 
who reside in Baltimore City and the: 10 remain-
ing counties of Maryland. In addition, we can-
not see in what way the restrictive nature of 
the statutory provisions bears any reasonable 
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relation to the public interest. 1149 
As a result of this ruling, Maryland watermen have 
been allowed to harvest oysters throughout the state 
without regard to boundaries. The considerations 
which influence a waterman's decision to seek shellfish 
outside his own county waters are similar to those 
which would influence watermen to cross state lines if 
residency requirements were eliminated. In addition, 
the effects of the increase in mobility since the 
Bruce decision should demonstrate, on a somewhat 
smaller scale, what might be expected to result if 
watermen were permitted to move freely through the 
Maryland and Virginia portions of the Chesapeake Bay. 
Thus, an understanding of changes in the Maryland 
-.~ 
oyster industry in the years since the Bruce decision 
should assist fisheries managers in anticipating the 
consequences of an elimination of state residency re-
quirements. 
The elimination of the county residency require-
ment has had significant impacts on Maryland's oyster-
men. These impacts were analyzed by Dr. Ivar Strand, 
a University of Maryland resource economist, in a 
recently completed Sea Grant study. 50 Prior to the 
Bruce decision, oyster densities (as measured by 
average productivity per boat day) varied widely 
from county to county. Oyster bars in certain coun-
ties yielded over twice the harvest per boat day ob-
tained in other counties. In the period after the 
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Bruce decision, presumably as a result of the transfer 
of fishing effort, oyster densities rapidly equalized 
throughout the state. Once watermen were no longer 
restricted to the waters of the home county, they 
found it profitable to motor to distant bars despite 
the additional costs in terms of fuel and traveling 
time. 
A correlative change occurred in the pattern of 
• 
prices for landed oysters among the counties. Prior 
to the Bruce decision, prices among counties varied 
widely and randomly. No one county's price was con-
sistently the highest. Random events such as good 
spatfall or the opening of closed shellfish areas 
would change the oyster density in one county, 
creating large supplies, and generating low prices 
for several years. Fishing effort could not be 
rapidly shifted to take advantage of the higher yields 
so as to increase landings and depress prices. 
After 197l, a much more stable and predictable 
/2attern of county oyster price~ emerged. As would 
be expected, all other things being equal, oysters 
landed in the county closest to the principal market-
ing center brought the highest price since the 
wholesaler's shipping costs were less. During this 
period oyster densities have remained relatively 
equal among the counties, as discussed,above. 
The basic differences in the Maryland and Virginia 
oyster fisheries must be kept in mind to protect 
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properly the lessons of Maryland's experiences with 
intercounty mobility to an interstate Chesapeake Bay 
oystery. Thorough studies of the respective state 
oyster programs have been made, 51 but the essential 
characteristics may be digested as follows: 
1. the average productivity of public oyster 
grounds in Virginia is considered to be lower than in 
52 Maryland; 
2. private oyster leases in Virginia cover about 
ten times the area leased in Maryland; 53 and 
3. there are over two thousand federally licensed 
fishermen around the Bay, seven hundred of whom are 
. . d . t . 54 principally engage in oys ering. 
It would appear that some portion of the licensed 
.... 
Virginia watermen would have an incentive for enter-
ing Maryland waters to oyster, to the extent that the 
greater returns for a given amount of effort offset 
transit costs. Just as the elimination of county 
residency requirements resulted in an equalization 
in oyster densities among the counties, the elimina-
tion of state residency requirements permits a trans-
fer of effort by Virginians to the more productive 
Maryland oyster bars. Since the transfer of effort 
will initially be toward Maryland, Virginia oysters 
will be spared in the short run. An equilibrium in 
regional densities should be rapidly achieved, as in 
the post-Bruce period, after which the concentration 
of effort will be ·drawn toward particular areas of 
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greater abundance (as determined by a good spatfall, 
seeding efforts or the opening of previously closed 
shellfish grounds) and away from poorer, less produc-
tive grounds (which may be affected by disease, pollu-
tion, predators, ice or other problems). 
Interstate mobility will exacerbate the tendency of 
the individual waterman to place a higher priority on 
/imme~iate returns rather than on long-term productivity 
of the public bars. In the case of a private leased 
bed, the lessee has the greatest incentive to adopt 
management practices oriented toward conservation and 
l~ng-term productivity. 55 He has the greatest incen-
tive to defer present harvesting to assure future 
propagation. During the period prior to the Bruce 
decision, each waterman shared the oyster grounds of 
his county only with other county residents. The re-
source was not exclusive, but within this limited 
"commons" it is possible that a waterman could still 
view deferred production as being within his economic 
/ self-interest. However, as these bars are opened to 
all state residents, and eventually to any waterman 
at all, the economic incentive of the individual to 
maximize innnediate gains from the available oyster 
resources must take greater precedence. 
Even after densities in each state have become 
equalized due to interstate mobility df oystermen, 
the Virginia oyster industry as a whole will be less 
vulnerable to the effects of a shifting oyster fleet. 
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This mobility would only affect public bars: a far 
greater part of the Virginia industry than the Mary-
land industry depends upon the use of privately leased 
oyster grounds. It is unlikely that nonresidents would 
claim right to immediately disenfranchise private 
leaseholders. Thus, the infiltration of nonresidents 
into the privately leased grounds in Virginia will 
be controlled by the manner prescribed by state law 
for applying for the right to lease a given tract. 56 
In each state private leases are presently limited to 
residents; 57 these restrictions appear to be as vul-
nerable to constitutional challenge as the general 
ban on nonresident oystermen. The state, as lessor 
of real property, is not immune to the reQuirements 
of the Fourteenth Amendment 58 or the Commerce Cla;~e 
any more than as regulator of fisheries within state 
waters. 
The duration of individual private leases, twenty 
years in both Maryland and Virginia, would slow the\/ 
influx of newcomers even if nonresidents did become 
eligible. Further delay would result from laws which 
gave preference to existing leaseholders for the 
right to renew their leases. Such a preference has 
some justification as a sound conservation measure 
since the lessee would be encouraged to employ prac-
tices likely to result in the greatest long-term 
yield. If the right to renew were assured, the 
lessee would not be inclined to deplete his oyster 
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beds at the end of the lease period. While the wide-
spread use of long-term, renewable private oyster 
leases in a state's management program would serve to 
buffer the impacts resulting from nonresident fisher-
men, it would also perpetuate the exclusion of non-
residents. In other circumstances, limited entry 
schemes which allowed preferences to prior holders of 
fishing licenses, have been declared unconstitutional 
where 'the effect was to exclude nonresidents. 59 How-
ever, the need for continuity in oyster leases may be 
found to justify the discriminatory effects. 60 
Maryland currently subsidizes its oyster repletion 
program at a cost of half a million dollars per year, 
in addition to revenues generated by inspection and 
61 
severance taxes. When the benefits of the reple-
tion program are no longer confined to state residents, 
political support for continuing the subsidy will de-
cline. If the repletion program is essential for the 
maintenance of productivity on public bars, then 
oyster taxes would have to be increased until suffi-
cient revenues are generated to fund the entire pro-
gram without subsidization. Note that even when 
taxes are raised to the point where the costs of the 
repletion program are covered, the state receives no 
net benefit in exchange for oysters harvested. 
With the elimination of state reside~cy require-
ments for oystermen, the states of Maryland and 
Virginia would have an unprecedented need for the 
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development of a joint management program. The Poto-
mac River Fisheries Compact, which provides for joint 
management of one river, could provide a model for an 
enlarged Chesapeake Bay oyster management scheme. 
The coastal zone management plans currently under 
development in both states should be modified to 
accommodate the need for greater cooperation in fish-
eries management as state residency restrictions are 
eliminated. 
In summary, the Maryland and Virginia oyster indus-
tries, like the fisheries in many coastal states, 
stand in a precarious position as a result of the 
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. decision. Without 
the insulation provided by state residency restric-._, 
tions, public oyster bars will be exposed to more 
intensive fishing effort. The state should plan now 
to restructure its oyster management prograrnto_ P:?-
tect its property interest in state oyster grounds, 
to avoid subsidizing nonresident oystermen out of 
______ .,, ---- ..... 
general state revenues and.to -·enco~age more wide-
spread cultivation of privately leased oyster beds. 
286 
Part IV 
INTRODUCTION OF EXOTIC SPECIES 
The preceding section concluded that it was in the 
interest of Maryland and Virginia to encourage more 
widespread cultivation of privately leased oyster 
--.. ------------beds . 
.,.......One aspect of increased private oyster culture must 
, 
be the examination of possible advantages of different 
species of oyster such as Crassostrea ~- The 
introduction of Crassostrea ~ into the Chesapeake 
Bay would be hampered by a number of legal constraints. 
In Maryland a state law provides that "[a] lessee may 
plant, cultivate, sow, or protect oysters only of the 
/species known as Crassostrea virginica in waters of 
the state. 1162 This measure was passed to curb some 
rather haphazard experimentation by a local shellfish 
entrepreneur. Maryland law is not as explicit on the 
question of whether the state is authorized to plant 
a new species. Although the state Department of 
Natural Resources is directed generally to "take mea-
sures which in its judgment seem best calculated to 
increase the productivity or utility of any part of 
the natural oyster bars of the state, 1163 the specific 
provisions dealing with the repletion program appear 
to authorize only intrastate movement Q'f seed, othe:r 
oysters and cultch. 64 
The Potomac River Fisheries Commission has no 
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specific regulation concerning the introduction of new 
species. Therefore, the Maryland laws prohibiting 
importation of & new species would apply on the Potomac 
River as we11. 65 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has recently enacted a 
comprehensive statute to regulate the introduction of 
fish and shellfish imported from outside the state. 66 
Under this statute, the Commissioner of Marine 
Resources, with the concurrence of the Director of the 
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, is authorized to 
establish a list of approved states or waters in the 
continental United States from which approved species 
of fish and shellfish may be imported. If a proposed 
import is not an approved species from an approved 
~-
area in the United States, specific permission must 
be obtained from the Commission prior to importation. 
It appears, therefore, that the introduction of a 
new species of oyster must be preceded by statutory 
changes in Maryland and, assuming Maryland wouid 
adopt a law similar to that enacted in Virginia, regu-
latory review and approval by state fisheries agen-
cies. What criteria should these agencies apply? 
The original list of species permitted for impor-
tation into Virginia is left entirely to the discre-
tion of the Commissioner of Marine Resources, subject 
to the veto of the Director of the Virginia Institute 
of Marine Resources. A species may be added t6 or 
removed from the list of approved species when the 
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Commissioner "deems it necessary for the protection of 
the waters of the Commonwealth. 1167 While such a stan-
dard may be applicable when considering the deletion 
of a species from the list, it hardly seems appro-
priate for determining when to allow the importation 
of a new species. Such an importation would rarely 
be necessary for the protection of state waters. 
The state of Washington, which has had more experi-
ence ~ith oyster seed importation, has adopted a com-
parable statute to regulate such imports. 68 Each 
shipment must be inspected and may be excluded from 
planting unless the state fisheries officials find 
that "the seed in question has been found to be free 
' 
of disease, infestation, pests and other substances 
which might endanger the oysters in the waters of 
this state." This regulation does not specifically 
address the question of the introduction of a new 
species. Possibly it was enacted after the importa-
tion of Japanese .Q_. gigas seed had become an estab-
lished practice to guard against the ancillary perils, 
rather than in response to the central question of 
species establishment and competition. 
Plainly the lawmakers in oyster growing areas have 
not dealt with this problem adequately. It is diffi-
cult to dispute the need for careful state regulation 
---·----··-- ---··· 
of the introductions of new shellfish s
1
pecies, .but 
the guidelines or criteria for determining whether a 
- > 
new species should be introduced must be established 
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based upon the current state of scientific knowledge 
····-- --- ···-·· ··• ,., _____ .,_ .. -- --------
of the possible risks and benefits presented. 
""-"-·---- --- ·····--___.. 
While governmental regulation appears to be neces-
sary, it does not answer or resolve all the legal 
uncertainties presented by the introduction of a new 
species. Let us assume that both Maryland and Virginia 
approve the introduction of Crassostrea gigas. One 
enterprising leaseholder then decides to invest in a 
shipment of Japanese seed for planting on several 
hundred acres of his private grounds, hoping for faster 
growth rates, greater resistance to pests, diseases 
and salinity variances, or more reliable reproduction 
than he had been able to obtain with Crassostrea vir-
ginica. We can further assume that a shipment of 
•. /. 
seed arrives, is inspected for pests and diseases, 
and is cleared for distribution on a large leased 
area along the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay. 
By his venture, this entrepreneur has created a 
number of risks of economic loss to watermen dependent 
upon public oyster bars and to lessees of other pri-
vate oyster leases using Crassostrea virginica. One 
obvious hazard is the possibility of bringing in an 
oyster predator or disease. One of the most destruc-
tive pests in the Puget Sound area is an oriental 
species of oyster drill, Tritonalia japonica, which 
was accidentally imported. 69 The spread of the 
fungus Dermocystidium marinum and the microparasite 
MSX is believed to have been tied to oyster 
2'90 
transplantations. 70 Is it possible to inspect a ship-
ment of seed oysters so thoroughly as to eliminate any 
possibility of a disease or pest infestation? If not, 
they present a substantial risk of damage beyond the 
boundaries of the entrepreneur's leased ground. 
A second area of risk is escape. Although at first 
blush, the idea of escaping oysters seems like a ludi-
crous concern, the reproductive process admits the 
, 
possibility of spatfall from the introduced species 
several miles from the planting location. Tidal cur-
rent velocities in the Bay vary from nearly zero to 
over two knots, 71 and .Q_. ~ larvae could well be 
swept to the beds of .Q_. virginica under cultivation on 
other leased or public grounds. There is no way to 
prevent such an occurrence in open water culture and 
the only restraint on this spreading would be the 
inability of the introduced species to reproduce and 
thrive in the host waters. Once introduced into exist-
ing .Q_. virginica beds, it is conceivable that a new 
species could become more abundant. Would this con-
stitute potential economic loss? The answer depends 
on the relative desirability and marketability of the 
two species. If the new species is inferior in taste 
or market acceptability, the leaseholder or waterman 
will suffer a loss equal to the decrease in revenues 
caused by the lesser quality of much of his harvest. 
This loss may be offset by an increase in production, 
if such an increase occurs. 
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Existing legal institutions are not likely to pro-
vide a ready solution to the problem of shifting eco-
nomic losses occasioned by the introduction of a new 
oyster species. An oyster planter who suffers such a 
loss could bring a lawsuit under one of several legal 
theories: nuisance, trespass or negligence theories 
are among the most likely to be employed. 72 However, 
the litigants would face substantial practical diffi-
culties in proving that a loss resulted from a specific 
importation by a specific defendant. Quantifying dam-
ages could be a wildly speculative exercise where har-
vests and prices are constantly changing, and where 
heavy rainfalls or winter icing might decimate the 
oyster population on a given bar. It may be poss~qle 
to prevail in a case if the importation occurred only 
one time and if the damage could be positively linked 
to that importation. Some leaseholders may be able 
to establish the value of an annual harvest by careful 
record keeping so that, assuming no other significant 
variables, the loss resulting from someone else's 
importation of a new species could be ~uantified within 
reasonable limits. Nonetheless, the costs in legal 
fees, expert witness fees and court costs could easily 
be expected to exceed $10,000. Since there is no 
administrative forum in which such claims could be 
adjudicated, a damaged planter would be forced to 
simply absorb his losses or face an expensive court 
process with little certainty to the outcome. 
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All this points to the necessity of proceeding with 
caution in the introduction of a new species in an 
area, like the Chesapeake Bay, which supports an exist-
fog oyster fishery Usirig a native species. Ultima:teiy, 
administrative agencies must make the difficult deci-
sion to allow or to prohibit an importation. But these 
agencies and the legislatures which must authorize the 
agenc~es to make such decisions must look to the 
scientific connnunity to determine with some certainty 
the likely consequences attending the introduction of 
a .new species. Our legal institutions can prevent an 
importation, regulate the manner of importation or. 
even adjust the claims of those who are damaged, but 
they are powerless to restore the biological integrity 
of the Bay once the decision has been made to introduce 
a new species. 
\ 
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DISCUSSION 
Nelson: Under the Douglas case, federally registered 
boats could not be excluded from fishing. This is for 
boats of greater than 5 tons displacements. How does 
this legislation relate to vessels of less than 5 tons 
displacement? 
Lewis: I think that the principles underlying the 
Douglas decision, aside from the narrow question of ~ 
• 
vessel registration, still apply to the unregistered 
fishermen and their boats. 
Power: It seems relevant to ask whether or not the 
owner of a vessel of under 5 tons displacement could 
successfully apply for and obtain a federal registra-
tion for that vessel. 
Blogaslowski: I own a vessel of less than 5 tons and 
did apply for federal registration. I was told that 
due to its size, the vessel could not be federally re-
gistered. I did not challenge the decision. 
Shaw: In the case of Maryland about $1,000,000 per 
year of state tax money is invested in maintaining the 
oyster bars in state waters. Thus, it could be said 
that Maryland manages its oyster fishery whereas the 
Menhaden Fisheries are essentially unmanaged at the 
state level. Does this investment of state money by 
Maryland not allow it certain jurisdiction over the 
exploitation of the Oyster Fishery? 
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Lewis: I don't think that you can avoid the princi-
ples that the United States are a "common market" by 
investing state money in a resource. 
Haskins: Is there sufficient flexibility within the 
federalism concept to allow for differential licensing 
fees for residents and nonresidents based upon the 
financial input of the state to maintaining the fish-
ery? 
Power: This argument could be made .!_£,you could de-
monstrate a good relationship between the magnitude 
of the state subsidy and the differential in the 
license fee. 
Nelson: A comment, I believe, that the productj~j.~y 
of the private leases in Maryland is approximately 
four times that of public bars despite the fact that 
the latter are generally on superior bottom. 
---·--·-··•··--•.-•·-·· ................. , ......... ,--. .,·-·····-·----·--
Power: That is a good point of emphasis. 
Andrews: This may not all be a one way street in 
favor of Virginia in that Maryland is generally short 
of seed oysters and would be able to collect seed in 
the James River, VA area. 
Power: There is another, as yet unchallenged, discri-
mination in the Maryland oyster laws which excludes 
corporations from participating in the oyster business. 
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I think that this is unconstitutional. It is ob-
viously a significant discouragement to bringing mo-
dern technology to the Bay. 
Lipovsky: I would just like to comment that in Wash-
ington state, about 80-90% of the oyster harvest is 
collected by hydraulic or mechanical dredge. This 
does not appear to have resulted in any detrimental 
effect on the fishery. In fact, there is some ques- ~ 
tion as to whether or not tilling an oyster bed with 
a bagless dredge is in fact beneficial. 
Lewis: Virginia also allows such dredging. 
Chew: In the state of Washington, there are hearings 
pending, relating to the use of escalator dredges"for 
clams and goeducks. If the decisions are made in 
favor of the local residents and environmentalists, 
and against the fishermen, there are some definite 
negative implications to the future use of dredges for 
the oyster industry. 
Nelson: In New England, I think it is fair to say, we 
would have no oyster industry were it not for the 
mechanical dredge. 
